Comments for Blogging the Second World War

Comment on Review of James Holland’s “ITALY’S SORROWS” by Giuseppe Paolo Mazzarello

Giuseppe Paolo Mazzarello — Thu, 22 Jan 2009 22:13:22 +0000

In the thirties Italy decided to be a a big and powerful country. We were not rich and called the rich and unpleasant countries “plutocratic”. If we had become rich, would have found an adjective suitable for us. One of our historical enemies, the German bloc, had a dictator we believed a good partner in business. Japan was in its far galaxy, our was the only country that went to war together with the nazis. Above all we thought to beat UK. Commonwealth included, we thought to beat half the planet. For the moment US were not involved, however maybe we believed to be able to give them a good trashing too. While the war was running its course, our initial poverty quickly become destitution. Then in Italy strange political military manoeuvres happened. It was no more clear who was our enemy and many soldiers came back home. Many foreign armies went to our territory and the situation was extremely confused. The war ended and we lost our dictator Mussolini as well as our king forever. Practically speaking, our nation did not exist and it was impossible to identify ourselves with it. At that point we were interested in US because they were the only ones who offered us a model. Unluckily we were not able to manage an open market. Twenty years later our politic system controlled completely that market.

Comment on Upcoming Conference… by Post-Blogging the Battle of the Mareth Line - Introduction « Thoughts on Military History

Mon, 19 Jan 2009 10:22:05 +0000

[...] series of posts has come our of a paper I delivered last year at a conference on Allied military effectiveness during the war in the Mediterranean. My paper dealt with the [...]

Comment on RETRIBUTION by Max Hastings. Review by Jonathan D. Beard by Thomas F. Ruhm

Thomas F. Ruhm — Wed, 31 Dec 2008 20:01:29 +0000

US censorship kept the American public, including the scientists on the Manhattan Project, from knowing of the ferocity of the Japanese resistance at Pelleliu, Iwo Jima and especially Okinawa until many years after 1945. These three battlefields were specially prepared by their commanding generals, as ordered by their superiors, to kill as many Americans as possible with a view to making the US become discouraged with the war and more amenable to agreeing to easier surrender provisions. Had the American public and the scientists been aware of what Truman, and most of our troops in the western Pacific theater (they thought they would all be killed in an invasion of the Japanese home islands), knew about the actual casualties incurred in those battles, and the fierce fighting that gave rise to those casualties, there would never have been any meaningful controversy over whether the bomb should have been used.

Comment on RETRIBUTION by Max Hastings. Review by Jonathan D. Beard by Bert Condie III

Bert Condie III — Wed, 10 Sep 2008 22:49:12 +0000

On the subject of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, you left out one of the most controversial and one of the most dramatic and interesting points of the whole battle which is the dispatch Halsey sends”not as an executive order, but as a battle plan to become effective[at his specific direction]. The dispatch mentions four fast battleships[inclduding New Jersey] two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers,fourteen destroyers;and these ships “will be formed” into Task Force 34 under Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee, Jr., and will engage decisively at long ranges.” The dispatch is picked up on the American Admiral’s radios who assume Task force 34 will be guarding San Bernardino Strait where Japanese Admiral Kurita, after being pummled by Halsey’s forces and turned back has now turned around and headed back for San Bernardino Strait. Halsey, meanwhile is headed North with 64 ships towards Ozawa’s 17 and has left the strait unguarded! Kurita’s force passes through the strait and starts attacking the small group of escort carriers etc. and there are many frantic calls for help asking about Task Force 34 etc. The last call comes straight from Admiral Mimitz in Pearl Harbor in plain english “saying in words Halsey regards as personally insulting: ‘The whole world wants to know where is Task Force 34? This sends Halsey into a raging fit as he slams his cap on the deck and is finally restrained. He finally turns around but to late to be of any help. Fortunately, Kurita for some inexplicable reason retreats.

Comment on RETRIBUTION by Max Hastings. Review by Jonathan D. Beard by name

name — Mon, 01 Sep 2008 02:02:00 +0000

Hello!,

Comment on Upcoming Conference… by An update… « Thoughts on Military History

An update… « Thoughts on Military History — Mon, 19 May 2008 15:13:54 +0000

[...] with was a submission for a paper for an upcoming conference at KCL and the IWM in July. The conference is on Allied Fighting Effectiveness in North Africa and Italy, 1942 – 1945. The conference will [...]

Comment on RETRIBUTION by Max Hastings. Review by Jonathan D. Beard by Sir Max Hastings Speaks at Pritzker Library « Blogging the Second World War

Sir Max Hastings Speaks at Pritzker Library « Blogging the Second World War — Mon, 05 May 2008 15:27:07 +0000

[...] Blogging the Second World War Exploring the Past, Present and Future of Second World War Scholarship « RETRIBUTION by Max Hastings. Review by Jonathan D. Beard [...]

Comment on RETRIBUTION by Max Hastings. Review by Jonathan D. Beard by Alan Weiss

Alan Weiss — Sun, 27 Apr 2008 16:10:08 +0000

I thought this was an even-handed, well researched work, and I don’t see where numbers of pages matter. I always thought it was about value. The barbaric tactics of the Japanese, which rivaled the Nazis, are presented without the normally ubiquitous political correctness, and the Australian labor performance was justifiably presented in a condemning manner. There were a few trivial errors, and Hastings missed talking about the last battleship to sink another battleship (Admiral Lee, I believe aboard the Washington), but these are too obscure to “cast doubt” on his scholarship.

The discussion about civilian bombing, the inexorable use of the bomb, the unbelievable industrial might of the US (over 100 carriers in the Pacific alone), and the clear swan song of the British Empire are invaluable history lessons. I think only John Toland’s The Rising Sun was a better work about the Pacific Theater, albeit he covered its entire duration.

Comment on RETRIBUTION by Max Hastings. Review by Jonathan D. Beard by justcorbly

justcorbly — Sat, 19 Apr 2008 22:20:57 +0000

Having just finished the book, I agree that the personal anecdotes were, sometimes, laid on a bit too thickly. But, that’s a minor complaint aout an otherwise outstanding piece of history.

Criticism that it’s too long at 550 pages seems misdirected.If someone interested in the history of the Pacific war is going to tire before getting to 550 pages, then they probably ought to just watch the History Channel.

I must disagree with the last comment regarding the justification for Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In fact, as I think Hastings makes clear, justification seen from the eyes of history cannot replace reality as seen in 1945. That reality, and today’s reality, are two different things.

I also disagree with the assertion that the use of the weapons precipitate the Cold War. That was precipitated by Stalin’s imperialism, particularly the de facto annexation of territory liberated by the Red Army.

Comment on RETRIBUTION by Max Hastings. Review by Jonathan D. Beard by Steve Naidamast

Steve Naidamast — Mon, 14 Apr 2008 17:32:24 +0000

After seeing this recent release from Max Hastings, I have no doubts about adding it to my personal library on military history. However, as a military historian myself, I have to take issue with Hastings support for the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan.

There is no doubt about the feelings of fighting Americans towards the Japanese. However, the strategic consequences of this act have already been proven to have been not warranted for the use of such a weapon. Truman’s own 3-month\1100-person study immediately after the war in the 1945 Pacific Air War Survey refutes the need to have dropped the bombs.

As to showing a sign of strength to Stalin; nothing could have been further from the truth. On the field of battle you don’t show a sign of strength to a paranoid-megalomaniac by demonstrating overwhelming force and then expect a rational response. Instead what Truman did, as Professor Andrew Bacevich cites in “American Empire”, is start the cold-war with a very dangerous adversary who immediately began his own nuclear arms development; which he would have done in any event.

So far, everything I have seen about Hastings new book that relates to this use of such a horrendous weapon appears to be taken solely from an emotional standpoint. Not only were over 68% of all scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project opposed to the bomb’s use but so too were most of Truman’s senior military personnel including Eisenhower.