Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45, by Max Hastings, March 2008, New York, Random House Inc. 656pp. $35.00 978-0-307-26351-3 (0-307-26351-7)
When Max Hastings chose “Retribution” as the title for his overview of the last two years of World War II in Asia, it is obvious that he had Japan in mind. This is the story of Japan reaping the whirlwind for the winds it had sown since 1937 in China, and since Pearl Harbor in 1941. But retribution also means a distribution of rewards and punishments, and it is here that Hastings stands out: this is the most judgmental work of military history I have ever read. Hastings passes out a little praise–he greatly admires William Slim for his generalship in Burma, and has kind words for Chester Nimitz–but his forte is denunciations. The most consistent target of his wrath is Douglas MacArthur, but his condemnation of William Halsey for his performance at Leyte Gulf is harsh as well. He also devotes an entire (short) chapter to condemning the Australian people, military, labor movement and leadership for their performance in the last stages of the war. But these are just the controversial denunciations. He reserves most of his anger for Japan, especially its leaders, from Hirohito down to individual officers, accusing most of them of combining casual cruelty with moral cowardice. But the Japanese are not alone: Hastings condemns all the Western powers for their patronizing, racist treatment of Asian allies, and, on the other side, sees both Chiang Kai-Shek and Mao Zedong as tyrants lacking human feelings for their own people.
But Retribution also intends to tell the story of the last two years of the war, and here Hastings faces major challenges. Unlike the war in Europe (Hastings covered its end in Armageddon, published in 2004) the conflict in Asia spanned a huge portion of globe, from Manchuria in the North to Australia in the South, and from Burma to Hawaii. It is unlikely the Soviet soldiers in Manchuria and the Australians fighting in New Guinea were even aware of each other’s existence. The author has chosen to combine chronology with a thematic approach. The book moves from early 1944, as the British prepare to recover Burma and the Americans plan for the invasion of the Philippines, to the war’s end with the atomic bombs and Soviet entry into the war. Narrative chapters recount the battles for Burma, the Philippines, and Okinawa, while thematic chapters deal with Japanese treatment of Allied prisoners, the war at sea, and so on. Sometimes this works better than others. Hastings obviously knows that the US Navy submarine force destroyed Japan’s trade and ability to supply its troops, but his “The War Underwater” chapter seems perfunctory. He is obviously far more interested in the decision to burn Japan’s cities with incendiary attacks, probably both because he is more at home with air forces and because the moral questions involved engage him.
It is difficult questions, moral, political and strategic that make Retribution interesting, and lift it above most military histories. I found his sections on the bombing of Japan–first burning out cities with incendiaries, then using nuclear weapons–to be excellent. He points out what people in 1945 knew: much of Hamburg, Berlin and Dresden had been reduced to ashes, with few second thoughts in London or Washington; Japanese treatment of Chinese civilians was well known, and their cruelty toward Allied POWs was becoming apparent. Attitudes at the time were not tinted by our experience of Japan as a peaceful nation, nor by our painful awareness of the threat of nuclear weapons to our own lives. At the same time, he is even-handed, telling how physicists such as Leo Szilard, belatedly aware of the genie they had unleashed, sought vainly to forestall the dropping of the bomb. And he emphasizes how the ultimate decision to end the war lay with the Japanese: even after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Russian entry into the war, the majority of the Japanese high command still favored fighting on at any cost. It was only when Hirohito belatedly showed courage that the tide turned.
If there is one fundamental problem with Retribution, it is that the book is too long. 550 pages will daunt some (potential) readers. And though I praise Hastings for adding so many voices–he interviewed scores of surviving veterans, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, American, British, etc.–to make the book come alive, these vignettes weigh it down. All too often he simply drops three or four paragraphs of testimony from American pilots, Chinese civilian victims, or others into a chapter without their adding much to its message. In addition, there are a few errors that careful fact-checking could have prevented. Naval history is a field I know well, so I noticed that he wrongly credits the USS Pennsylvania with 16-inch guns, the Japanese at Samar with 15-inch guns, and describes destroyer Shigure as a heavy cruiser. None of these is a significant mistake, but they reduce a reader’s confidence in a book. On the balance, however, this is a good book, especially for American readers. It covers aspects of the Pacific war–Burma, Manchuria, Australia–not often given much space in American accounts. And, more than anything else, Hastings always keeps the political and human-rights issues involved in the war clearly in sight.
Tags: China, Douglas MacArthur, Japan, Max Hastings, United States, William Slim, World War II
March 28, 2008 at 7:48 pm
Douglas MacArthur isn’t doing so hot with historians lately. Check out Halberstam’s “The Coldest Winter” for some tough language on his role in Korea.
Nice review for sure. I definitely want to read this book to fill in some of my gaps about the war in the pacific.
I realize it’s apples to oranges but is “Retribution” a stronger book than “Armageddon” ?
March 28, 2008 at 7:59 pm
Jonathan: nice review. It seems more and more historians are filling pages with endless streams of testimony and oral history. I think this is an unfortunate development. All but the best most carefully chosen oral histories detract from a book.
Brian: I’ve read a great deal of Hastings. I think “Retribution” is better than “Armageddon”. In “Retribution” Hastings gets it write this is military history at its best- and I would add some of his older books are quite good “Overlord”, “Das Reich” etc.
April 4, 2008 at 3:02 am
I don’t think Hastings is comfortable with Naval history.
He short changes it in all his books. I reserve comment on this one until I read it.
April 14, 2008 at 5:32 pm
After seeing this recent release from Max Hastings, I have no doubts about adding it to my personal library on military history. However, as a military historian myself, I have to take issue with Hastings support for the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan.
There is no doubt about the feelings of fighting Americans towards the Japanese. However, the strategic consequences of this act have already been proven to have been not warranted for the use of such a weapon. Truman’s own 3-month\1100-person study immediately after the war in the 1945 Pacific Air War Survey refutes the need to have dropped the bombs.
As to showing a sign of strength to Stalin; nothing could have been further from the truth. On the field of battle you don’t show a sign of strength to a paranoid-megalomaniac by demonstrating overwhelming force and then expect a rational response. Instead what Truman did, as Professor Andrew Bacevich cites in “American Empire”, is start the cold-war with a very dangerous adversary who immediately began his own nuclear arms development; which he would have done in any event.
So far, everything I have seen about Hastings new book that relates to this use of such a horrendous weapon appears to be taken solely from an emotional standpoint. Not only were over 68% of all scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project opposed to the bomb’s use but so too were most of Truman’s senior military personnel including Eisenhower.
April 19, 2008 at 10:20 pm
Having just finished the book, I agree that the personal anecdotes were, sometimes, laid on a bit too thickly. But, that’s a minor complaint aout an otherwise outstanding piece of history.
Criticism that it’s too long at 550 pages seems misdirected.If someone interested in the history of the Pacific war is going to tire before getting to 550 pages, then they probably ought to just watch the History Channel.
I must disagree with the last comment regarding the justification for Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In fact, as I think Hastings makes clear, justification seen from the eyes of history cannot replace reality as seen in 1945. That reality, and today’s reality, are two different things.
I also disagree with the assertion that the use of the weapons precipitate the Cold War. That was precipitated by Stalin’s imperialism, particularly the de facto annexation of territory liberated by the Red Army.
April 27, 2008 at 4:10 pm
I thought this was an even-handed, well researched work, and I don’t see where numbers of pages matter. I always thought it was about value. The barbaric tactics of the Japanese, which rivaled the Nazis, are presented without the normally ubiquitous political correctness, and the Australian labor performance was justifiably presented in a condemning manner. There were a few trivial errors, and Hastings missed talking about the last battleship to sink another battleship (Admiral Lee, I believe aboard the Washington), but these are too obscure to “cast doubt” on his scholarship.
The discussion about civilian bombing, the inexorable use of the bomb, the unbelievable industrial might of the US (over 100 carriers in the Pacific alone), and the clear swan song of the British Empire are invaluable history lessons. I think only John Toland’s The Rising Sun was a better work about the Pacific Theater, albeit he covered its entire duration.
May 5, 2008 at 3:27 pm
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September 1, 2008 at 2:02 am
Hello!,
September 10, 2008 at 10:49 pm
On the subject of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, you left out one of the most controversial and one of the most dramatic and interesting points of the whole battle which is the dispatch Halsey sends”not as an executive order, but as a battle plan to become effective[at his specific direction]. The dispatch mentions four fast battleships[inclduding New Jersey] two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers,fourteen destroyers;and these ships “will be formed” into Task Force 34 under Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee, Jr., and will engage decisively at long ranges.” The dispatch is picked up on the American Admiral’s radios who assume Task force 34 will be guarding San Bernardino Strait where Japanese Admiral Kurita, after being pummled by Halsey’s forces and turned back has now turned around and headed back for San Bernardino Strait. Halsey, meanwhile is headed North with 64 ships towards Ozawa’s 17 and has left the strait unguarded! Kurita’s force passes through the strait and starts attacking the small group of escort carriers etc. and there are many frantic calls for help asking about Task Force 34 etc. The last call comes straight from Admiral Mimitz in Pearl Harbor in plain english “saying in words Halsey regards as personally insulting: ‘The whole world wants to know where is Task Force 34? This sends Halsey into a raging fit as he slams his cap on the deck and is finally restrained. He finally turns around but to late to be of any help. Fortunately, Kurita for some inexplicable reason retreats.
December 31, 2008 at 8:01 pm
US censorship kept the American public, including the scientists on the Manhattan Project, from knowing of the ferocity of the Japanese resistance at Pelleliu, Iwo Jima and especially Okinawa until many years after 1945. These three battlefields were specially prepared by their commanding generals, as ordered by their superiors, to kill as many Americans as possible with a view to making the US become discouraged with the war and more amenable to agreeing to easier surrender provisions. Had the American public and the scientists been aware of what Truman, and most of our troops in the western Pacific theater (they thought they would all be killed in an invasion of the Japanese home islands), knew about the actual casualties incurred in those battles, and the fierce fighting that gave rise to those casualties, there would never have been any meaningful controversy over whether the bomb should have been used.